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The Supreme Court’s “weaponized” First Amendment has been its
strongest antiregulatory tool in recent decades, slashing campaignﬁnance regulation, public-sector union ﬁnancing, and pharmaceutical
regulation, and threatening a broader remit. Along with others, I have
previously criticized these developments as a “new Lochnerism.” In this
Essay, part of a Columbia Law Review Symposium, I press beyond
these criticisms to diagnose the ideological outlook of these opinions and
to propose an alternative. The leading decisions of the antiregulatory
First Amendment often associate free speech with a vision of market efficiency; but, I argue, closer to their heart is antistatist fear of entrenchment by elected officials, interest groups, and bureaucrats. These opinions
limit the power of government to implement distributional judgments in
key areas of policy and, by thus tying the government’s hands, constrain
opportunities for entrenchment. This antidistributive deployment of
market-protecting policy is the signature of neoliberal jurisprudence.
But this jurisprudence has deep problems in an order of capitalist
democracy such as ours. Whenever the state cannot implement distributional judgments, markets will do so instead. Market distributions are,
empirically speaking, highly unequal, and these inequalities produce
their own kind of entrenchment—class entrenchment for the wealthy. A
jurisprudence that aims at government neutrality by tying the distributional hands of the state cannot achieve neutrality but instead implicitly
sides with market inequality over distinctively democratic forms of
equality. Once we see that any constitutional vision involves some relationship between the “democratic” and the “capitalist” parts of capitalist
democracy, it becomes possible not just to criticize the Court’s siding with
market winners but also to ask what kinds of equality-pursuing policies
the Constitution must permit to reset that balance in favor of democracy.
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INTRODUCTION
Although the Supreme Court’s “weaponiz[ed]” First Amendment1
often comes dressed in rhetoric associating political and civic life with an
idealized market, it is aimed less at advancing a perfect market than at
impeding very imperfect politics. It aims centrally at averting partisan
and bureaucratic entrenchment—at preventing political elites from
picking future winners from among candidates, parties, and policies.2
The problem is that, even if it accomplishes this (a question this Essay does
not attempt to answer), it does so at the cost of supporting class entrenchment: the concentration of political power in a relatively small and
privileged echelon of Americans.3 It does so by constitutionally protecting
the translation of unequal wealth into unequal political power. This Essay
aims to illuminate the premises about the political economy of capitalist
democracy that make these doctrinal outcomes plausible and even seemingly obvious, and to advance an alternative approach.
The Court has put an antidistributional principle at the center of
today’s First Amendment doctrine: “[T]he concept that government may
restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance
the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment . . . .”4
This per curiam anathema on official distributional judgments in regulating speech—in this instance, the spending of personal wealth in electoral

1. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2501
(2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
2. See infra Part I.
3. See infra section II.A.
4. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976) (per curiam).
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advocacy5—has echoed down from the 1976 ruling in Buckley v. Valeo to
vindicate corporate campaign spending in Citizens United v. FEC 6 and
invalidate conditional public ﬁnancing in Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s
Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett,7 among other consequences.8 Prohibiting
certain kinds of political choices about distribution, especially of political
inﬂuence itself, has become a key doctrinal tool for deﬁning government
neutrality under the First Amendment.9 Its effect, however, is not to avoid
distributional decisions but to hand them off implicitly to markets.
An effective response must make the case for active democratic
engagement with the terms of political power itself, centrally including
the political power that arises from economic power. It must say what
kind of interaction a democratic republic should build between economic and political power, and for what reasons. It must offer, that is, a
political economy of power. This Essay thus moves from reconstructing
the worldview that supports certain doctrines to addressing the question
of what arrangement of market power and political power First Amendment
doctrine should aim to cultivate.
Part I of this Essay elaborates the argument sketched above regarding the structure and sources of the Court’s campaign-ﬁnance cases. Part
II develops an alternative picture of the most important distortion of
democracy in recent decades: the class entrenchment of the wealthy in
political inﬂuence. Turning to the question of what political economy of
power is desirable in a democratic republic, this Essay proposes that a
democratic republic must be able to achieve political will formation
around a creditable idea of the common good. This goal requires a
modicum of civic equality, which in turn requires that the polity be able
to set the terms of its own will formation—that is, to legislate on the formation and distribution of political inﬂuence, the very topic the current
Court puts out of bounds. The Essay goes on to suggest that this doctrinal pursuit of civic equality should take notice—as the Court’s current
jurisprudence furtively does—of the political-economic order it aims to
make possible, here one of stronger democracy and greater equality and
security. One might call it a social-democratic jurisprudence. In contrast,
the Court’s recent First Amendment jurisprudence, with its conceptual
annulment and practical embrace of class entrenchment, has produced a
bosses’ Constitution. Part III develops this approach further through the
First Amendment cases addressing public-sector union fees.

5. See id. at 7.
6. See 558 U.S. 310, 349–50, 365 (2010) (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48–49).
7. See 564 U.S. 721, 727–28, 741 (2011) (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48–49).
8. See, e.g., McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1440–42, 1450 (2014) (citing Buckley,
424 U.S. at 48–49) (invalidating a statutory limit on aggregate campaign contributions).
9. See infra Part I.
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I. THE COURT’S POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SPEECH
A.

Speech, Democracy, and Entrenchment

The Court’s reasoning in the political-spending cases adopts a metaphor of public, political speech as occurring in an efficient market, “the
‘open marketplace’ of ideas protected by the First Amendment,” in which
“ideas ‘may compete’ . . . ‘without government interference.’”10 In this
marketplace, electoral “expenditure is political speech presented to the
electorate,” an offering that “presupposes that the people have the
ultimate inﬂuence over elected officials.”11 The purpose of the advertising is “advising voters on which persons or entities are hostile to their
interests.”12 Within this image, political speech (including spending) is
thus “an essential mechanism of democracy, for it is the means to hold
officials accountable to the people” by presenting voters with competing
accounts of their situation and interests.13 So understood, speech is the
cornerstone of “a republic where the people are sovereign.”14
These passages bolster decisions holding that limits on campaign
spending may not be constitutionally justiﬁed as measures to reduce “distortion” of political power or “corruption” in the form of undue political
inﬂuence.15 The Court’s praise of advertising’s service to democracy is a
buttress for the view that government must not be allowed to make distributional judgments concerning political speech and inﬂuence because
“[l]eveling electoral opportunities means making and implementing
judgments about which strengths should be permitted to contribute to the
outcome of an election . . . , and it is a dangerous business for Congress to
use the election laws to influence the voters’ choices.”16 It is avoiding this
summum malum that powers the praise of political advertising and marketstyle voter choices as a democratic summum bonum. The Court treats
elections and political debate as if they were perfect markets because this
premise secures them against the vices of political rent seeking.
The Court’s jurisprudence, accordingly, is not invested in the thoroughgoing coherence or adequacy of the market metaphor. As Professor David
Grewal and I have emphasized elsewhere, modern arguments favoring
private economic power over democratic countermeasures tend to have
shifting, overlapping aspects: affirmative idealization of the efficiency of

10. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 354 (quoting N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez
Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 208 (2008)).
11. Id. at 360.
12. Id. at 354.
13. Id. at 339.
14. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (per curiam).
15. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 349–61 (rejecting the antidistortion and anticorruption rationales for regulating corporate political speech).
16. Id. at 350 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S.
724, 742 (2008)).
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market arrangements; moralized identiﬁcation of the rights and
transactions of the marketplace as uniquely compatible with liberty,
equality, and dignity; a tragic register insisting that the predictable
deﬁciencies of politics generally, or certain democratic institutions in
particular, prevent them from doing better than markets can, even if we
might wish otherwise; and a preargumentative “common-sense” dimension
that implicitly dismisses certain alternatives as “off the table” before the
serious argument has begun.17 It is typical to move among these different
registers almost unselfconsciously because they hang together as an
ideological worldview. Indeed, besides their praise of markets and
denigration of politics, the political-spending opinions invoke the “worth”
and “voice” of speakers, as if corporations were marginalized populations
in search of dignity, and liberally invoke the language of
nondiscrimination, almost reﬂexively borrowing the moral language of
First Amendment liberties.18 So the Citizens United Court announced of
the corporate-spending ban, “The censorship we now confront is vast in
its reach . . . [and] ‘muffle[s] the voices that best represent the most
signiﬁcant segments of the economy.’”19 In these opinions, however,
avoiding the pathologies of politics is the keystone.
The implicit standpoint of the campaign-ﬁnance cases, then, is the
following: The constitutional evil to be avoided is manipulation by the
political class of the rules for later elections, which would “deprive the
public of the right and privilege to determine for itself what speech and
speakers are worthy of consideration” and will receive majoritarian
endorsement.20 Seen in this way, limiting campaign spending is a usurping attempt to predetermine the course of democratic self-rule, just like
prohibiting antiwar pamphleteering or banning Karl Marx’s writings.21
The Court’s way of averting this hazard involves it in a certain view of
democratic will formation. In this latter view, voting decisions are fairly
characterized on the paradigm of the fully informed economic agent of
neoclassical modeling, who gratefully accepts the helpful data that advertising provides.22 This upbeat idea that the wealthy, whether through the
17. David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Introduction: Law and Neoliberalism, 77
Law & Contemp. Probs., no. 4, 2014, at 1, 6–7.
18. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340–41 (“By taking the right to speak from some
and giving it to others, the Government deprives the disadvantaged person or class of the
right to use speech to strive to establish worth, standing, and respect for the speaker’s
voice.”).
19. Id. at 354 (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 257–58 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment in part)).
20. Id. at 341.
21. See generally Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961
Sup. Ct. Rev. 245, 256–57 (arguing that the First Amendment should protect, among other
things, philosophy and public discussions of public issues because of their importance to
self-government).
22. See generally Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J.
Econ. 99, 99 (1955) (“Traditional economic theory postulates an ‘economic man,’ who, in
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corporate form or otherwise, are simply submitting arguments for assessment by their fellow citizens, is not an empirical claim about political
persuasion and judgment. It is a half-theoretical, half-rhetorical premise.
Current First Amendment doctrine tends toward this premise in good
part to avoid a square confrontation with the problems that arise from its
rejection of explicit distributional judgments concerning political influence.
B.

A Theoretical and Historical Origin Point for the Court’s View

The judicial outlook sketched above emerged before the rise of the
“conservative legal movement” that today furnishes many of its spokespersons on the bench.23 Its early articulation arose from a shared sense of
the distinctive problems of capitalist democracy and the role of a constitutional order in mitigating them. The social and intellectual world of its
early spokespersons was the end of the post–World War II “great exception,” the last years of a period of widely shared growth, the ﬂattest
distributions of wealth and income the country has seen, and a strong
role for organized labor in the Keynesian management of the national
economy.24
From the point of view of the worried center-right, the postwar era
presented a threat: Too much political control of the economy, bolstered
by unions and by the left, would stiﬂe personal liberty and initiative,
leading to some combination of stagnation and tyranny.25 The inﬂuence
of this perspective on elite legal culture was evident in Justice Powell’s
1971 memorandum to Eugene Sydnor of the Chamber of Commerce,
written shortly before his nomination to the Supreme Court, in which
Powell called for a full-court press by business in politics, universities,
media, and the courts for “the preservation of the system [of free
enterprise] itself.”26 Justice Powell’s memo crystallized a development in
twentieth-century conservative jurisprudence that has come to full ﬂower

the course of being ‘economic’ is also ‘rational.’ This man is assumed to have knowledge
of the relevant aspects of his environment which, if not absolutely complete, is at least
impressively clear and voluminous.”).
23. See generally Steven M. Teles, The Rise of the Conservative Legal Movement
(2008) (charting the development, since the 1970s, of the “conservative legal movement”
into a “sophisticated and deeply organized network”).
24. See Wolfgang Streeck, Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism,
at xiii–xiv (Patrick Camiller & David Fernbach trans., 2d ed. 2017) [hereinafter Streeck,
Buying Time]; David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Inequality Rediscovered, 18 Theoretical
Inquiries L. 61, 61–67 (2017) [hereinafter Grewal & Purdy, Inequality] (describing the economic growth and optimism that prevailed in the three decades following World War II).
25. See Kim Phillips-Fein, Invisible Hands: The Businessmen’s Crusade Against the
New Deal 150–212 (2010) (describing business interests’ mobilization of ideas against the
regulatory state in the late 1960s and 1970s).
26. Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Eugene B. Sydnor, Jr., Chairman, Educ.
Comm., U.S. Chamber of Commerce 30 (Aug. 23, 1971) [hereinafter Powell Memorandum]
(on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
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in the twenty-ﬁrst: an across-the-board resistance to the politics of
distribution, in which political spending plays a central role.
The fear of state-led distribution has been a frequently renewed
resource in U.S. politics since James Madison’s warnings against redistributive “factions” in Federalist No. 10.27 It deﬁned the right wing of the
classically liberal Republican Party in the ﬁrst Gilded Age, and the
Liberty League and other opponents of the New Deal recast it for their
purposes.28 When the conservative Reader’s Digest published a polemical
summary of libertarian economist Friedrich Hayek’s already polemical
The Road to Serfdom, an antistatist beachhead was announced at the apex
of America’s (always incomplete and racially stratiﬁed) closest approach
to social democracy.29 Hayek and his fellow Chicago economist Milton
Friedman (whom Powell admiringly quoted in his 1971 memo30) brought
to the defense of markets theoretical sophistication and, especially in
Hayek’s case, the ambition to synoptic social theory.31 By the early 1970s,
these thinkers, like Powell, were developing the neoliberal response to a
cross-national wave of labor militancy, social-movement discontent, and
inﬂationary pressures (the last widely seen as connected with organized
labor’s expectation of regular wage hikes, even as productivity slowed),32
which among thinkers of the second Frankfurt School came to be known
as the West’s “legitimation crisis.”33 Hayek and his allies helped the reﬂective wing of American business to formulate an imperative to restore

27. See The Federalist No. 10, at 53 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (warning against redistribution and debt relief as the signal threats of an unchecked local
democracy).
28. See President Grover Cleveland, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1893)
(“[Economic paternalism] perverts the patriotic sentiments of our countrymen and
tempts them to pitiful calculation of . . . sordid gain . . . . It undermines the self-reliance of
our people and substitutes in its place dependence upon governmental favoritism.”);
Phillips-Fein, supra note 25, at 3–25 (detailing the mobilization of free-market ideas against
the New Deal).
29. See Angus Burgin, The Great Persuasion: Reinventing Free Markets Since the
Depression 87–122 (2012) (detailing the popularization and reception of Hayek’s thought
and its role in conservative retrenchment against the New Deal); see also Grewal & Purdy,
Inequality, supra note 24, at 66 (noting exceptions to the post–World War II “trend of
economic inclusion,” such as African Americans).
30. See Powell Memorandum, supra note 26, at 5–6.
31. See, e.g., Friedrich A. Hayek, The Mirage of Social Justice 107–32 (Phoenix ed.
1978) (theorizing the nature and beneﬁts of the market order).
32. See Wolfgang Streeck, The Crises of Democratic Capitalism [hereinafter Streeck,
Crises], in How Will Capitalism End? 73, 77–78 (2016) [hereinafter Streeck, How Will
Capitalism End?] (recounting the rise of labor militancy and inﬂation beginning in the
late 1960s).
33. See Streeck, Buying Time, supra note 24, at 1–46 (recounting the “legitimation
crisis” debates of the 1970s and criticizing their failure to anticipate the resilience of
capitalism).
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competitive pressure throughout the economy and, conversely, to roll
back uses of the state that baffled or annulled market competition.34
Hayek followed political economist Joseph Schumpeter and other
skeptics of robust democracy in holding that such ideas as “society” and
“the political community” were sentimental mystiﬁcations, and distributional politics a semiorganized form of looting.35 Hayek contended,
moreover, that abandoning market coordination implied moving toward
the only systemic alternative: outright political command of economic
life.36 He thus worked out in theory the position that Powell adopted in
his memo:
The threat to the enterprise system . . . also is a threat to
individual freedom.
....
. . . [T]he only alternatives to free enterprise are varying
degrees of bureaucratic regulation of individual freedom—
ranging from that under moderate socialism to the iron heel of
the leftist or rightist dictatorship.
....
. . . [F]reedom as a concept is indivisible. As the experience
of the socialist and totalitarian states demonstrates, the
contraction and denial of economic freedom is followed
inevitably by governmental restrictions on other cherished
rights.37
Hayek argued that, if democracy were to be viable despite these deﬁciencies, the scope of politically open questions must be closely restricted—
speciﬁcally to exclude questions of distribution.38
The Court’s worry about political entrenchment thus has a particular historical paradigm: the defense of market ordering, with its accompanying liberties, against the self-perpetuating rule of a bureaucratic state
acting on behalf of well-organized or ideologically sympathetic interest
groups. Hayek and Friedman joined public-choice theorists such as
Gordon Tullock and James Buchanan in warning against this political
34. See, e.g., Burgin, supra note 29, at 186–213 (describing Friedman’s advocacy for
laissez faire principles in the 1970s).
35. See Friedrich Hayek, ‘Social’ or Distributive Justice, in The Essence of Hayek 62,
67 (Chiaki Nishiyama & Kurt R. Leube eds., 1984) (“I believe that ‘social justice’ will ultimately be recognized as a will-o’-the-wisp which has lured men to abandon many of the
values which in the past have inspired the development of civilization . . . .”).
36. See id. at 91–93 (arguing that the only alternative to market allocation in the
social division of labor is, in effect, the conscription of some people in defense of the privileges of others).
37. Powell Memorandum, supra note 26, at 32–33.
38. See Friedrich Hayek, Whither Democracy?, in The Essence of Hayek, supra note
35, at 352, 357–58 (arguing for the construction of a government that systematically avoids
distributional decisions because the “different treatment which is necessary in order to
place people who are individually very different into the same material position seems . . .
not only incompatible with personal freedom, but highly immoral”).
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entrenchment as the distinctive hazard of democratic capitalism.39 The
key to staving off this danger, it was inﬂuentially argued on the neoliberal
right, was to cordon off questions of distribution from active political
contestation.
It was in this setting that the Court announced per curiam that the
refusal of distributional judgments was the essential commitment of the
Constitution’s protection of freedom of speech.40 When one tries picturing
the goal of averting political redistribution as a jurisprudential keystone,
other doctrinal developments form an arch around it. The affirmative
action cases head off distributional judgments and political entrenchment
along racial lines, as in the opinions of Justices O’Connor and Scalia in
Croson 41 and Justice Roberts’s opinion in Parents Involved.42 The Court’s
treatment of public-sector unions in Janus v. AFSCME (discussed in Part
III) suggests a pair of touchstone worries: that the support of publicsector unions might provide a means of political entrenchment, and that
the political empowerment of such unions might enable them to foist
ruinous distributional demands on local and state governments.43 The
Spending Clause opinions in National Federation of Independent Business v.
Sebelius, especially the joint dissent of four conservative Justices, aim at
heading off Congress’s imposing a redistributional form of social
provision on the states via the power of general taxation.44 In short, the
antidistributional nerve of Buckley and the subsequent campaign-finance
cases connects that reasoning both to the rising neoliberal political
economy of the 1970s and to a substantial body of post–Warren Court
jurisprudence, from the Nixon appointees’ halt of Warren Court and
Great Society egalitarianism to the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts’ rollback
39. See generally James M. Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent:
Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (1962) (arguing for a positive theory of
politics and government based on the analysis of decision dynamics among self-interested
actors), reprinted in 2 The Selected Works of Gordon Tullock (Charles K. Rowley ed.,
2004).
40. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
41. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493–97 (1989) (plurality
opinion) (O’Connor, J.) (noting the danger of “simple racial politics” and the fact of
Richmond’s majority-black city government as reasons for applying strict scrutiny to affirmative action programs); id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (rejecting the
notion that governments may use racial classiﬁcations to ameliorate the effects of past
discrimination).
42. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 725–32
(2007) (expressing “concern that racial balancing has ‘no logical stopping point’” and, if
permitted, will embed racial proportionality permanently in American life (quoting
Croson, 448 U.S. at 498)).
43. See infra notes 98–107 and accompanying text.
44. See 567 U.S. 519, 690–91, 706–07 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ.,
dissenting) (arguing that federalism principles should prohibit Congress from requiring
states to choose between adopting a federally funded social-provision policy, on the one
hand, and funding their own while simultaneously funding other states’ federally subsidized programs through federal taxes, on the other).
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of the same. Constitutional resistance to redistribution is at the heart of
this jurisprudence.
This Part has diagnosed a set of premises about markets and democracy in the Court’s First Amendment doctrine and located an origin
point for these in the political, economic, and legal debates of the early
1970s. The next Part provides a larger context for explaining and
assessing the Court’s First Amendment doctrine, as well as criteria for
marking out a different, more egalitarian and democratic path forward. I
argue that a capitalist democracy like that of the United States must manage two competing sets of imperatives: those of marginal productivity
aimed at proﬁt and those of social provision and self-rule. While the
Justices who have shaped the current doctrine have seen chieﬂy the danger that politics poses to markets, the greater danger is the threat that
capitalism’s dynamics pose to social provision and self-rule. Preserving
democracy requires actively fostering the conditions for its success. The
kind of redistributive policy that the Buckley Court made anathema is, in
fact, indispensable.
II. AN ALTERNATIVE: THE TENSIONS OF CAPITALIST DEMOCRACY
Capitalist democracy welds together two quite different principles
for generating answers to the basic problems of social coordination: Who
plays what roles in cooperation, who gets what resources in distribution,
and who has what authority in the political decisions that set the rules of
further cooperation and distribution?45 Capitalist ordering, based on the
private ownership of productive resources (including labor power) and
their market-mediated allocation in pursuit of the highest marginal
return, tends persistently to produce inequality in wealth and income.46
It also produces class stratiﬁcation, as different social groups play different roles, from investor and rentier to professional and laborer.47
45. This is a fairly conventional account of the questions any system of social cooperation must answer. See, e.g., Barrington Moore, Jr., Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience
and Revolt 9 (1978) (dividing the problem of social coordination into problems of authority,
division of labor, and allocation of goods and services).
46. See Wolfgang Streeck, Crises, supra note 32, at 74–75 (characterizing the “capitalist” half of capitalist democracy as governed by a “principle[] . . . of resource allocation . . .
operating according to marginal productivity, or what is revealed as merit by a ‘free play of
market forces’”); David Singh Grewal, The Laws of Capitalism, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 626, 629–44
(2014) (reviewing Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Arthur Goldhammer
trans., 2014)) (summarizing Piketty’s findings of persistent, cross-national, multicentury
trends toward increasing inequality of both income and wealth).
47. See Grewal, supra note 46, at 632 (summarizing Piketty’s diagnosis of class stratiﬁcation under a system of “patrimonial capitalism” in which inherited wealth creates a
sizable rentier class). This class-stratiﬁed division of labor is not unique to capitalist societies and in fact has characterized all industrial societies, including the authoritarian
socialist regimes of the Soviet bloc. See, e.g., Kazimierz M. Słomczyński & Irina TomescuDubrow, Class Structure and Social Stratiﬁcation in Poland from the 1970s to the 2010s, in
Dynamics of Class and Stratiﬁcation in Poland 39, 39–65 (Irina Tomescu-Dubrow et al.
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Democratic ordering, by contrast, presents a principle of majority
decisionmaking by members of a community of political equals.48 To give
a democratic response to the basic problems of social coordination is to
say that the terms of cooperation and distribution must ultimately take
their legitimacy from the collective decision of a community of equals,
such as a principle of “social need or entitlement, as certiﬁed by the
collective choices of democratic politics.”49 A democratic polity might
have good reason to embrace market allocation for any number of purposes, but the use of markets would have its justiﬁcation in a collective
choice among equals; democracy would have to come ﬁrst. The relation
between the two principles of capitalist democracy is particularly fraught
in the allocation of political authority to set the rules of cooperation and
distribution.50 Wealth and class stratiﬁcation tend constantly to undermine the equality of citizens (which is always artiﬁcial and legally constituted), giving certain classes (the wealthy, professionals, investors) the
capacity to set political agendas and control important decisions.51 This
overriding of the democratic principle by its capitalist competitor is the
eds., 2018) (providing a sociological overview of these dynamics under Soviet-bloc socialism and subsequent capitalism). The tensions in relation to American-style capitalist
democracy, however, are especially acute.
48. See Streeck, Crises, supra note 32, at 75 (characterizing the “democratic” half of
capitalist democracy as governed by a principle “based on social need or entitlement, as
certiﬁed by the collective choices of democratic politics”). This is not merely a conceptual
stipulation. As David Grewal and I have recently argued, democratic authorization of political power constitutes not just the ethical core of American constitutionalism’s conception
of legality but also the very foundation and structure of the Constitution’s authority. See
David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, The Original Theory of Constitutionalism, 127 Yale
L.J. 664, 681–90 (2018) [hereinafter Grewal & Purdy, Original Theory] (reviewing Richard
Tuck, The Sleeping Sovereign: The Invention of Modern Democracy (2016)). While a
sociological description such as Streeck’s captures essential difficulties in capitalist democracy, these difficulties arise and present the questions I am exploring here speciﬁcally
because of the constitutional commitment to democratic self-rule.
49. Streeck, Crises, supra note 32, at 75. While I ﬁnd Streeck’s characterization an
invaluable shorthand, I don’t mean to follow him, or the Polanyian tradition in which he
writes, in sometimes seeming to essentialize the national community in ways that can invite
perceived affinities with dangerous forms of nationalism. See Grewal & Purdy, Original
Theory, supra note 48, at 666–73 (explaining that the polity of democratic constitutionalism is an artiﬁcial, legally constituted entity—though no less real for that, a point that
should be not at all mysterious to lawyers); Adam Tooze, A General Logic of Crisis,
London Rev. Books (Jan. 5, 2017) (reviewing Streeck, How Will Capitalism End?, supra note
46), http://www.lrb.co.uk/v39/n01/adam-tooze/a-general-logic-of-crisis [http://perma.cc/
3ACT-QFV5] (arguing that Streeck strays toward this essentialization).
50. Cf. Streeck, Crises, supra note 32, at 76 (“[T]heories of political economy . . .
recognize market allocation as just one type of political-economic regime, governed by the
interests of those . . . in a strong market position. An alternative regime, political allocation, is preferred by those with little economic weight but potentially extensive political
power.”).
51. See Martin Gilens, Affluence and Inﬂuence: Economic Inequality and Political
Power in America 1 (2012) (“The American government does respond to the public’s
preferences, but that responsiveness is strongly tilted toward the most affluent citizens.”).
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perennial tendency of capitalist democracy. American democracy demonstrates the tendency well.
A.

Distributional Contests and Class Entrenchment

American democracy is profoundly divided along class lines.
Professor Martin Gilens concluded, summing up his own research and
that of others, that “under most circumstances, the preferences of the
vast majority of Americans appear to have essentially no impact on which
policies the government does or doesn’t adopt.”52 The policy preferences
of wealthy Americans diverge systematically from those of the general
public: Signiﬁcantly smaller shares of the wealthy support substantial
redistribution (17% versus 52%), national health insurance (32% versus
61%), affordable college (28% versus 78%), and a living wage (40% versus 78%).53 Elected representatives themselves are predominantly professional or wealthy. Less than two percent of members of the U.S. Congress
entered politics from blue-collar jobs.54 It is estimated that at least half of
congresspersons are millionaires and that the median net worth of a
member of Congress is over $1 million.55 The disproportionate representation of the wealthy reinforces their disparate influence: “[L]awmakers
52. Id.; see also Larry M. Bartels, Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the
New Gilded Age 242–44 (2d ed. 2016) (ﬁnding that the political views of the poor had
almost no inﬂuence on Senate roll call votes during the 112th Congress); Martin Gilens &
Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and
Average Citizens, 12 Persp. on Pol. 564, 572 (2014) (ﬁnding that nonwealthy and unorganized voters wield almost no political inﬂuence). But see Yosef Bhatti & Robert S.
Erikson, How Poorly Are the Poor Represented in the U.S. Senate?, in Who Gets
Represented? 223, 223–24 (Peter K. Enns & Christopher Wlezien eds., 2011) (“[W]e do
not challenge Bartels’s ﬁnding of unequal representation as necessarily incorrect. We do,
however, offer what we believe to be compelling reasons to interpret the evidence with
considerable caution.”). See generally Kate Andrias, Separations of Wealth: Inequality and
the Erosion of Checks and Balances, 18 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 419, 421 (2015) (summarizing
data on inequality and arguing that the U.S. government is appropriately understood as
captured by the wealthy). With regard to the debate just noted, my claims about class
entrenchment do not depend on Gilens and Page’s conclusion that the wealthy nearly
always prevail in policy contests. I claim only that political power is profoundly unequal.
53. See Benjamin I. Page, Larry M. Bartels & Jason Seawright, Democracy and the
Policy Preferences of Wealthy Americans, 11 Persp. on Pol. 51, 57–64 (2013). This ﬁnding
cannot really be considered authoritative, as it is based on interviews with eighty-three
wealthy individuals in the Chicago area, but data on this issue are scarce. See id. at 53
(describing the methodology behind these ﬁndings).
54. See Nicholas Carnes, White-Collar Government: The Hidden Role of Class in
Economic Policy Making 7–20 (2013) (summarizing ﬁndings that over the past century no
more than two percent of members of Congress have been members of the working class
and that from 1999 to 2008 only six percent of members of Congress had spent any time at
all in blue-collar jobs).
55. See Russ Choma, One Member of Congress = 18 American Households: Lawmakers’
Personal Finances Far from Average, OpenSecrets.org (Jan. 12, 2015), https://www.opensecrets.
org/news/2015/01/one-member-of-congress-18-american-households-lawmakers-personal-financesfar-from-average/ [http://perma.cc/FK96-ABRN].
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from different classes tend to think, vote, and advocate differently on
economic issues,”56 with working-class representatives more likely to
support progressive economic legislation and to attend to the priorities
of less wealthy constituents.57
The inﬂuence that wealth exercises over political judgment is not
mostly transactional—not a matter of bribes—but structural and social. It
is structural in the sense that costly campaigns require constant infusions
of money, and political representatives and their staffers know where to
secure it.58 It is structural, too, in that a high-dollar inﬂuence industry
creates an increasing overlap in personnel between politics and lobbying,
as politicians who have relied on money directed from the inﬂuence
industry during their elected careers move over to inﬂuence brokering
upon leaving office.59 The social character of unequal inﬂuence is a product of these structural characteristics. Those who hold power know, listen
to, care about, and identify with those who—like them—have money.60
This is a form of class entrenchment. Reﬂecting on it suggests that
class entrenchment arises readily under capitalist democracy and may
even be fairly described as the default form of politics under that regime.
The reasons for this are not obscure. The American political situation
just described is an instance of a general tendency. Capitalist economies
tend, historically and today, toward high and growing levels of economic
inequality.61 An economy that distributes gains unequally tends to produce successful constituencies that want to sustain their success.62 They
have the means to do so by virtue of being economically advantaged.63
The policies they support maintain or amplify the inequality-producing
dynamics that generated their advantages in the ﬁrst place.64 The pattern

56. Carnes, supra note 54, at 3.
57. See id. at 71–82 (summarizing the distinctive priorities of working-class representatives).
58. See Zephyr Teachout, Corruption in America 246–57 (2014) (setting out the
various ways in which the need for money directs the efforts and attention of politicians).
59. See id. at 246–47 (explaining that in 1970 only three percent of congressional
representatives entered lobbying upon leaving office, whereas today that ﬁgure is over ﬁfty
percent).
60. See Bartels, supra note 52, at 301–05 (describing the narrow and class-stratiﬁed
world of social contact and inﬂuence that shaped Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner’s
response to the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis in the course of the Obama Administration’s 2009
policymaking efforts); Teachout, supra note 58, at 249–53 (describing the gift economy of
the wealthy and inﬂuential).
61. See Grewal, supra note 46, at 629–42 (summarizing ﬁndings to this effect).
62. See Page, Bartels & Seawright, supra note 53, at 67 (discussing how many political
preferences of wealthy Americans can be explained by their interest in protecting personal
wealth).
63. See Gilens & Page, supra note 52, at 572 (“[E]conomic elites are estimated to
have a quite substantial, highly signiﬁcant, independent impact on policy.”).
64. See Carnes, supra note 54, at 111–20 (“Even when high-stakes economic legislation is on the line, lawmakers from different classes think and vote differently. . . . [I]n a
class-balanced Congress, businesses probably would have enjoyed fewer tax breaks and
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of class advantage will, of course, differ from polity to polity, depending
in part on the ways in which economic power may be converted to political influence, and vice versa. For instance, campaign donation limits that
are impossible to reach for most voters but within the reach of professionals
and executives will empower a nexus of those classes and political brokers
clustered around parties or their proxies, while unlimited independent
expenditures will empower very wealthy political entrepreneurs such as
Sheldon Adelson and Thomas Steyer.65 The goal of the campaign ﬁnance
legislation reviewed and weakened in Buckley v. Valeo was to empower a
mix of parties and dedicated volunteers—the archetypical protagonists of
“civil society”—to the relative disadvantage of large donors and spenders.66
In seeking to avert incumbent and partisan entrenchment, the
Court has developed a First Amendment jurisprudence that shields and
fosters class entrenchment. It has also made class entrenchment constitutionally invisible by characterizing political spending as serving equal
citizenship rather than undercutting it, deﬁning the structural characteristics of class entrenchment as insufficiently problematic to justify
campaign-ﬁnance regulation, and declaring constitutionally out of
bounds the redistribution of political inﬂuence toward greater equality.67
Such redistribution is the signal means for a polity to assert democracy
against the default drift toward class entrenchment.68 Appreciating the
structural character of class entrenchment and the role of political
spending in it helps to underscore that actively pursuing political equality
is the only alternative to that default drift. The Court’s First Amendment
jurisprudence simultaneously knocks out this buttress of democracy and
obscures why a polity would need it in the ﬁrst place.
This is what makes the Court’s characterization of capitalist democracy ideological. Its characterization of capitalist democracy generally,
its praise of market-modeled elections, and its wariness of partisan and
incumbent entrenchment might, taken alone, be characterized as an
imaginary, or a worldview, or simply a set of heuristics: a way of organizing
would have had to shoulder more of the economic fallout from unforeseeable events
[between 1999 and 2008].”).
65. See generally Robert G. Kaiser, So Much Damn Money: The Triumph of Lobbying
and the Erosion of American Government 3–24 (2009) (detailing the extent of spending in
politics); Top Individual Contributors: All Federal Contributions, OpenSecrets.org, https://
www.opensecrets.org/overview/topindivs.php [http://perma.cc/K8VJ-BKUQ] (last visited Aug.
14, 2018) (listing Adelson and Steyer among the top individual contributors in the 2018
election cycle).
66. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1976) (per curiam) (characterizing the
statute under review, the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA)); Richard Briffault,
The Federal Election Campaign Act and the 1980 Election, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 2083, 2083
(1984) (reviewing Herbert E. Alexander, Financing the 1980 Election (1983) and Elizabeth
Drew, Politics and Money (1983)) (“The central thrust of FECA was to move the campaign
ﬁnance process in a more egalitarian and public direction.”).
67. See supra section I.A.
68. See infra section II.B.3.
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institutions and events into certain patterns of salience, highlighting
certain priorities and dangers and discounting others.69 All social practices, including forms of reasoning such as legal argument and academic
inquiry, occur within imaginative frames of this kind.70 When I say that
the court’s characterization is ideology, I mean something more. These
judicial characterizations obscure central features of social and political
reality and, indeed, render them legally unintelligible in ways that
facilitate class entrenchment while denying the basic tension within capitalist democracy. To say that jurisprudence is ideological is to say that it
mischaracterizes social and political reality by denying one or more of its
constitutive conflicts and, at the same time, takes sides in those conflicts.71
B.

Principles for a Democratic First Amendment

So, what should an egalitarian First Amendment jurisprudence do?
This section addresses this question through a characterization of selfrule under capitalist democracy.
1. Neutrality, Right and Wrong. — The first step is to recognize that class
entrenchment is a perennial tendency of capitalist democracy and arises from
the tensions between the regime’s two competing principles of social coordination.72 Appreciating this makes clear that, in one sense, the jurisprudential
goal of enforcing state neutrality via the First Amendment is a chimera.
69. See generally Jedediah Purdy, After Nature 6–7 (2015) (“Imagination means how
we see and how we learn to see, how we suppose the world works, how we suppose that it
matters, and what we feel we have at stake in it. It is an implicit, everyday metaphysics . . .
[in which] some facts stand out . . . while others recede . . . .”); Charles Taylor, A Secular
Age 171–76 (2007) (setting out a philosophical account of the role of a “social imaginary”
in organizing experience).
70. See, e.g., 2 Charles Taylor, Philosophical Papers: Philosophy and the Human
Sciences 21–28 (1985) (challenging the “epistemological orientation which would rule
interpretation out of the sciences of man”).
71. See Karl Marx, The German Ideology: Part I, in The Marx-Engels Reader 146,
148–55 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978) (suggesting that in ideology “men and their
circumstances appear upside-down as in a camera obscura”); see also Jorge Larrain, The
Concept of Ideology 60–61 (1979) (“[I]deology is reaffirmed as a consciousness which
conceals contradictions in the interest of the dominant class. The inverted character of
ideological consciousness corresponds to the real inversion of social relations . . . .”).
Marx’s deﬁnition of ideology as obscuring social reality is very stark, and any strict application of it requires a ﬁrm idea of what exactly counts as “social reality.” I do not, in general,
share the young Marx’s conﬁdence that patterned and discernible material relations are
the genuine stuff of social life and liberal interpretations the mere ideological dressing.
See Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy 20–21 (Maurice Dobb
ed., S.W. Ryazanskaya trans., Int’l Publishers 1970) (1859) (“The totality of these relations
of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which
arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond deﬁnite forms of social
consciousness.”). Having said that, however, the basic tensions of capitalist democracy are
so foundational, and their obscuring so signiﬁcant, that a starker characterization of the
situation seems justiﬁed. See infra note 72 and accompanying text.
72. See generally Streeck, Crises, supra note 32, at 74–75 (outlining the capitalist and
democratic principles that perpetually compete in capitalist democracies).
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Any doctrinal elaboration of the First Amendment will both presuppose
and advance a specific dynamic between the twinned principles of capitalist
democracy. Among other effects, any version of the First Amendment will
tend to facilitate or impede certain forms of class entrenchment.
This is not to say that neutrality is impossible or undesirable in doctrine or that decisions must be outcome oriented according to the
Justices’ feelings about speciﬁc cases.73 If neutrality means avoiding this
caricature of unprincipled decisionmaking, then neutrality is both desirable and achievable. But such neutrality has multiple possible forms. It
might be consistent with neutrality to permit no private expenditure on
political campaigns, relying on public ﬁnancing and the strength of
volunteer efforts and other shows of popular support. Alternatively, neutrality might require the doctrines of Buckley and Citizens United.74 It might
be, too, that the best version of neutrality would start from a constitutional presumption that campaign-ﬁnance regulation is legitimate, subject to some constraint of reasonableness.75 Any of these doctrines would
be neutral both (1) in the formal sense that they do not require freeroaming, case-by-case judicial decisions about the distribution of political
power and (2) in the substantive sense that they implement a version of the
idea that the state is obliged not to make invidious distinctions among
citizens.76 None, however, would be neutral in the sense of implying no
attitude toward the competing tendencies of capitalist democracy: economic inequality and political equality. An egalitarian First Amendment
jurisprudence should seek a version of neutrality that aims at supporting
political equality against economic inequality.
2. Democratic Will Formation. — A First Amendment jurisprudence
concerned to foster, or at least not inhibit, the vitality of democratic
equality must be oriented toward collective will formation that allows the
majority to rule. The self-legislation of the majority, binding for all, is the
normative core of modern constitutional democracy.77 Constitutional
73. But cf. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 75 & n.22 (1980) (arguing against a
claim for the judicial redistribution of voting power by denying the possibility of
identifying a legitimate distributional principle).
74. See supra notes 4–6 and accompanying text.
75. This is basically the position that Justice Stevens recommends adopting by constitutional amendment, a recourse he advises only because of the Court’s spendingprotective precedents in this area. See John Paul Stevens, Six Amendments: How and Why
We Should Change the Constitution 57–80 (2014).
76. See Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire 199–201 (1986) (explaining the essential role
in legal legitimacy of equal concern and respect for the interests and perspectives of those
governed—that is, the second sense of neutrality); Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 Yale
L.J. 509, 539 (1988) (explaining that the virtue of the ﬁrst sense of neutrality lies in “disabling certain classes of decisionmakers from making certain kinds of decisions”).
77. See Grewal & Purdy, Original Theory, supra note 48, at 683 (explaining that conceptual and institutional innovations enabled a “new practice of popular authorship of fundamental law by the political community” in eighteenth-century constitutional thought);
see also Jack M. Balkin, Republicanism and the Constitution of Opportunity, 94 Tex. L.
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interpretation should take place with an eye to sustaining the conditions
of popular sovereignty, preventing the drift of government into deep or
irremediable elite usurpation.78
Collective will formation requires that the political process be able to
resolve disputes by authoritative decisions connected with a conception
of the common good.79 While the content of any “common good” is
notoriously indeterminate and, indeed, would contradict self-rule were it
neatly ﬁxed in advance, politics must be able to produce an account of the
common good that will be generally recognized as legitimate even as it is
contested through further politics. The political production of a common good becomes impossible if citizens pervasively mistrust the results
of the political process—for instance, if they doubt the objectivity of
voting, they regard the system as irremediably rigged by such means as
gerrymandering and inﬂuence peddling, or they come to regard their
political opponents as so essentially hostile to their values and interests as
to be disqualiﬁed from sharing in any common good.80 For a democratic
republic to produce such an account of the common good, there must
be no pervasive exclusion from political participation, and the distribution of political inﬂuence must not be so marked by inequality that the
majority of people who must live under the law cannot regard themselves
in any serious sense as having authorized it.81 A democratic republic
Rev. 1427, 1431–37 (2016) (deﬁning republican government by reference to principles
including self-rule, the common good, and civic equality). My assertion above the line
obviously implicates a deep and long-running body of debate in political thought, which I
do not pretend to survey. My goal here is to set out a normative orientation with strong
roots in both the U.S. constitutional tradition and the general theory of capitalist
democracy.
78. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 77, at 1435–37 (identifying republicanism with anticorruption and antientrenchment principles).
79. Cf. id. at 1433 (explaining that republicanism relies on a notion of the common
good).
80. See Steven Levitsky & Daniel Ziblatt, How Democracies Die 102–44 (2018)
(exploring the potential of polarization to undermine liberal democracy by eroding
mutual toleration and institutional forbearance).
81. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 77, at 1433–34, 1437–39 (arguing that republicanism
emphasizes both civic equality and a good constitutional structure, including in the realm
of political economy); Joseph Fishkin & William E. Forbath, The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution,
94 B.U. L. Rev. 669, 687–96 (2014) (“Extreme concentrations of economic and political
power undermine equal citizenship and equal opportunity. In this way, oligarchy is incompatible with, and a threat to, the American constitutional scheme.”); Ganesh Sitaraman,
Economic Structure and Constitutional Structure: An Intellectual History, 94 Tex. L. Rev.
1301, 1319–27 (2016) (arguing that the Founders believed that “relative economic equality was necessary for republican government”). By this standard, the United States failed in
important ways to be a democratic republic rather than a Herrenvolk republic before the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, and its democratic status is thrown into doubt today by racial
inequality in wealth, education, and criminal justice; by mass incarceration, especially
when accompanied by disenfranchisement; and by the presence of a large population of
unauthorized migrants who live under the laws of the United States but play hardly any
part in their production or authorization. See Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ.,
2013–2014 Civil Rights Data Collection: A First Look 3–8 (2016), https://www2.ed.gov/about/
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requires for its legitimacy the consent of living generations, not simply
the inheritance of past political acts. Any government that prevents the
current political community from renewing or revising its own basic
commitments usurps popular sovereignty.82
Constitutional interpretation can play only a relatively modest part
in any program to achieve these conditions, and this goes a fortiori for
the interpretation of any one part of the Constitution, such as the First
Amendment.83 That being said, the First Amendment has come to be
closely connected with the structure of political contests, and there are
signiﬁcant stakes in its interpretation. At present, First Amendment doctrine presents a substantial barrier to popular sovereignty–renewing
measures. An alternative approach should lead First Amendment jurisprudence to permit, even facilitate, the renewal of popular sovereignty,
partly by linking the desiderata of democratic will formation to an
account of the political economy of capitalist democracy that is both
more realistic about market ordering and more committed to the prerogatives of a democratic polity.
3. Necessary Redistribution. — Democracy requires the deliberate and
ongoing adjustment of economic power—distributional judgment.84 The
posture of distribution-blind neutrality that the Court has adopted in the
First Amendment cases discussed here implicitly approves ways of contesting democratic will formation that tend to undercut democracy by
offices/list/ocr/docs/2013-14-first-look.pdf [https://perma.cc/TP8P-ETAR] (identifying racial
inequalities in U.S. public education in contexts such as school discipline, access to highlevel math and science courses, and chronic absenteeism); Jenny Gathright, Forget Wealth
and Neighborhood. The Racial Income Gap Persists, Nat’l Pub. Radio: Code Switch (Mar.
19, 2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2018/03/19/594993620/forget-wealthand-neighborhood-the-racial-income-gap-persists (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review)
(“[I]n 99 percent of neighborhoods in the United States, black boys earn less in adulthood
than white boys who come from similar socioeconomic backgrounds[,] . . . undermin[ing]
the widely-held belief that class, not race, is the most fundamental predictor of economic
outcomes for children in the U.S.”); Leah Sakala, Breaking Down Mass Incarceration in the
2010 Census: State-by-State Incarceration Rates by Race/Ethnicity, Prison Policy Initiative
(May 28, 2014), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/rates.html [https://perma.cc/6L9QZT27] (“Nationally, according to the U.S. Census, Blacks are incarcerated five times more
than Whites are, and Hispanics are nearly twice as likely to be incarcerated as Whites[.]”).
82. See Grewal & Purdy, Original Theory, supra note 48, at 681–91 (outlining the
origins and logic of this principle).
83. Cf. Leslie Kendrick, Another First Amendment, 118 Colum. L. Rev. 2095, 2112
(2018) (“The goal of seeking a more egalitarian First Amendment is, ﬁrst and foremost, to
achieve a more egalitarian society. I doubt whether this tail can wag that dog.”).
84. See, e.g., John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 97 (1971) (“[A]s far as possible the
basic structure [of society] should be appraised from the position of equal citizenship.”);
id. at 277–80 (noting the need for ongoing redistribution to maintain “the fair value of
the equal liberties,” that is, to make formal liberty a meaningful basis for a more robust
equality among citizens); Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice 291–303 (1983) (“At a certain
point in the development of an enterprise, then, it must pass out of entrepreneurial control; it must be organized or reorganized in some political way, according to the prevailing
(democratic) conception of how power ought to be distributed.”).
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systemically amplifying the inﬂuence of the wealthy and super wealthy
and (as discussed in the next Part) weakening workers’ and others’ capacity to organize themselves for collective action.85
An egalitarian First Amendment jurisprudence would be marked by
a willingness to accept certain risks on behalf of democratic self-rule. Part
of the reason a democratic polity rules itself is so that it can address constitutional questions in an ongoing fashion: how its self-rule shall happen,
what forms of economic power shall register in political life, and what
some of the terms of cooperation shall be among social members.86 A
polity can decide, for instance, to favor time-intensive and face-to-face
activity over costly and heavily mediated forms of argument. In fact, that
is just the sort of decision democratic republics should be able to make
over their own future practices.
Lawmaking inevitably and appropriately structures the political process to build up the constituencies and institutions that will channel
energy and mobilization into future will formation. Democratic institutions iteratively reproduce and revise themselves.87 If they are judicially
impeded from revisiting the terms of self-rule, then other forces will
establish those terms through drift, the accretion of economic power,
and the strategic self-organizing of advantaged industries and classes.88
The conﬁguration of economic power in relation to political power does
not stand still over time, and someone (really, many persons and institutions) will give it a shape. If a political community cannot do this work,
the work will still happen by other means and on other terms. An egalitarian First Amendment need not empower judicial prescription of basic
distributional questions, but it requires judicial recognition of the democratic prerogative to answer those questions.
4. Process and Substance: Democracy and Social Democracy. — Constitutional jurisprudence is connected with the substance of the economic
order that it authorizes. New Deal jurisprudence authorized a regime of
partial corporatism, extensive unionization, social provision through an
interweaving of state and private (often employer-based) obligations, and
economic planning.89 It was not only a jurisprudence about the scope
85. See infra notes 98–107 and accompanying text.
86. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
87. See Seyla Benhabib, Democratic Iterations: The Local, the National, and the
Global, in Another Cosmopolitanism 41, 41–44 (Robert Post ed., 2006) (illustrating how
“democratic iterations” mediate the will formation of democratic majorities). These institutions need not be representative or permanent, like legislatures, but may also include
such institutional majoritarian practices as elections and constitutional referenda.
88. See supra notes 58–64 and accompanying text.
89. See William E. Forbath, The New Deal Constitution in Exile, 51 Duke L.J. 165, 166
(2001) (“The constitutional vision New Dealers championed . . . held that all Americans had
rights to decent work and livelihoods, social provision, and a measure of economic
democracy, including rights on the part of wage-earning Americans to organize and
bargain collectively with employers.”). See generally Gérard Duménil & Dominique Lévy,
The Crisis of Neoliberalism 281–93 (2011) (describing the main tenets of the New Deal as
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and forms of self-rule in an industrial economy, as official functionalist
narrations tended to have it.90 It was also a jurisprudence of permission
for (a modest and ﬂawed) social democracy.91 Conversely, as sketched
earlier, the current jurisprudence of distributional neutrality shares its
origins with discourses, polemics, and programs that were aimed at
blocking and rolling back the statist egalitarianism of the New Deal and
the Great Society, which its critics recast as a form of corrupting interestgroup entrenchment.92
There are many reasons for a polity to deploy markets as its basic economic mode, from efficiency to personal autonomy.93 But it is quite another thing for the same polity to constrain itself constitutionally to give
the resulting economic arrangements a major role in its future political
will formation.94 When market ordering is constitutionalized in this
fashion, it tends to move from being part of a menu of governing strategies
that a political community might adopt and pursue to being itself a key
determinant of which options even appear on the menu, let alone get
chosen.95 Constitutionally forbidding ongoing engagement with the
structure of economic and political power takes away much of democracy’s
reason for being.
The stakes of self-rule for citizens (and noncitizen social members)
in capitalist democracy include taming or eliminating arbitrary and overweening exercises and concentrations of power and building up the conditions of digniﬁed, unfrightened existence and activity in a community
of relative equals. At any time, these goals take speciﬁc institutional
forms—unions, election laws, universal health care, the creation of public
the federal regulation of labor relations, the implementation of large public-works
programs, and the protection of workers’ rights to unionize and collectively bargain).
90. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127–29 (1942) (finding that the Commerce
Clause authorized regulation of wheat production on the basis of its aggregate effect on
interstate commerce).
91. See Forbath, supra note 89, at 166. I do not mean to deny either the many ﬂaws
of what we call “the New Deal” or its complexity and variety. See, e.g., Ira Katznelson, Fear
Itself: The New Deal and the Origins of Our Time 156–94 (2013) (outlining how the reach
and radicalism of New Deal reforms were limited by compromises with Jim Crow
segregation).
92. See supra section I.B.
93. See, e.g., Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom 8 (2d ed. 1982) (“Economic
arrangements play a dual role in the promotion of a free society. On the one hand, freedom in economic arrangements is itself a component of freedom broadly understood . . . .
In the second place, economic freedom is also an indispensable means toward the achievement of political freedom.”); id. at 167 (“[T]he essential function of payment in accordance with product in a market society is to enable resources to be allocated efficiently
without compulsion . . . .”).
94. For a summary of the ways in which these values may interact in various market
arrangements, see Jedediah Purdy, The Meaning of Property 123–27 (2010) (drawing on
and applying Professor Amartya Sen’s account of the kinds of values that markets may
serve).
95. See supra notes 58–64 and accompanying text.
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utilities, guarantees against harassment and exploitation—and constitutional adjudication turns, accordingly, to whether such measures are
required, favored, permitted, or forbidden. Today the issue seems to
many of us to be a choice between oligarchy and a democratic-republican
renewal.96 To rework the link between economic and political concentrations of power, that renewal may have to move from the market-inﬂected
state skepticism of the 1970s and 1980s to a posture that understands the
mutual constituting of political and economic citizenship in terms that
are more social democratic and more committed to the organized power
of working people and mobilized citizens in contradistinction to wealth
and capital than any that has counted for much in recent decades. We
should consider what it might be like, not just to grit our teeth and
acknowledge this conclusion as a lesson foisted on jurisprudence by recent
political science and macroeconomics, but to embrace it as part of the
horizon of a possible better world.
This Part has framed First Amendment jurisprudence within the
context of capitalist democracy, arguing for the necessity of the redistributive policy that Buckley anathematized and for a conception of
neutrality that aims explicitly at maintaining a certain relation between
economic and political ordering, rather than allowing one to emerge by
default. The full implications of this view, of course, are beyond the scope
of a single Essay. The next Part offers one application: a diagnosis of the
Court’s recent treatment of public-sector union fees as a threat to free
expression and an alternative view that understands such fees as essential
parts of building the class power that is necessary in a capitalist democracy if it is to remain democratic. It shows, moreover, that this idea is not
alien to American jurisprudence. Indeed, Justice Frankfurter believed
something along these lines.97
III. UNION FEES AND THE SHAPE OF ECONOMIC POWER:
FURTHER DEFINING THE ALTERNATIVES
In June 2018, the Court ruled in Janus v. AFSCME that the First
Amendment forbids public-sector unions from charging nonmember
public employees in their bargaining units “agency fees” for employmentrelated services and advocacy.98 The Court framed the issue as one of
individual liberty from state compulsion. Justice Alito invoked Justice
Jackson’s great phrase, “[N]o official . . . can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or

96. See, e.g., Fishkin & Forbath, supra note 81, at 670–73 (positing democratic
political economy as a counterweight and alternative to oligarchy); Sitaraman, supra note
81, at 1304 (same).
97. See infra notes 116–120 and accompanying text.
98. See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448,
2459–60 (2018).
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force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”99 Justice Alito
warned, “Forcing free and independent individuals to endorse ideas they
ﬁnd objectionable is always demeaning.”100
As in the political-spending cases discussed in Part I, the Court
invoked the dangers of entrenchment and self-dealing, noting that the
case arose from a political context in which Illinois had nearly $160 billion in unfunded pension and retiree healthcare liabilities and sought in
bargaining to drive down employee costs.101 The defendant union instead
“advocated wage and tax increases, cutting spending ‘to Wall Street
financial institutions,’” and other left-of-center measures.102 Justice Alito’s
opinion presented these events as evidence that “[w]hat unions have to
say . . . in the context of collective bargaining is of great public
importance” and amounts to political speech that agency fees subsidize.103
It further noted that collective bargaining can involve “controversial
subjects such as climate change, the Confederacy, [and] sexual orientation
and gender identity.”104 Justice Alito’s questioning in oral argument
signaled alignment with the Hayek–Friedman–Powell line of concern
about the proliferation of redistributionist policies that might stem from
the entrenchment of political inﬂuence. He worried aloud that an
empowered public-sector union might “push a city to the brink and
perhaps over the brink into bankruptcy.”105
Oral argument also indicated that at least one of the Justices who joined
Justice Alito’s opinion understood the agency-fee requirement in Janus as
a violation of the anti-redistribution principle of Buckley. Justice Kennedy
pushed the union’s lawyer toward the concession that the fee amounted
to an impermissible redistribution of political speech and thus posed a
danger of entrenchment. Justice Kennedy pressed AFSCME’s lawyers to
acknowledge that, “if you do not prevail in this case, the unions will have
less political influence.”106 When David Frederick conceded the point,
Justice Kennedy replied, “Isn’t that the end of this case?”107 That is to say,
if the requirement to pay agency fees shapes the political playing field by
directing resources to union advocacy, it must violate the First Amendment.
Janus, then, has the same logic as the political-spending cases. At its
core is the plaintiff who wishes to determine how his money is disbursed
99. Id. at 2463 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting W.
Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).
100. Id.
101. See id. at 2474–75 (recounting the budget problems in Illinois).
102. Id. at 2475 (quoting Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 33 Pub.
Emp. Rep. for Ill. ¶ 67 (Ill. Labor Relations Bd. 2016), 2016 WL 7645201).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 2476 (footnotes omitted).
105. Transcript of Oral Argument at 63, Janus, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (No. 16-1466), 2018 WL
1383160.
106. Id. at 54.
107. Id.
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and who connects his money with constitutionally protected speech by
showing its relevance to political debate. The individual-rights core of the
opinion is buttressed by the structural worry that the challenged regime
distributes the power of political inﬂuence in a way that entrenches certain established interests, here public-sector unions. The worry about
distribution and entrenchment of political inﬂuence is linked, in turn,
with a speciﬁc political outcome that is to be avoided: an empowered set
of public employees with an agenda of egalitarian redistribution. Publicsector unions are cast here in the same role as the self-entrenching officials and bureaucrats who ﬁgured as the bête noire of the Buckley-era
turn to an anti-redistributionist First Amendment doctrine.
A.

The Court’s View of Workers’ Interests, and an Alternative

The assumption that the associational interest to be protected in
unions’ membership and political activity is a negative and individual
one—an opt-out108—excludes a different way of understanding the relationship of organized labor to democratic will formation. The interest in
refusing unwanted associations is a privacy interest, one that has great
power in many legal domains, from the common law guarantee against
physical invasion to the personal rights of substantive due process.109 But is
the institutional structure of bargaining power and political advocacy that
connects large employers with large bodies of workers best understood as a
domain of private and voluntary relations, or as a domain of shared arrangements in which participation is in some important respects ineluctable
once one is in the workplace? If the economy is a concert of individuals,
orchestrated by personal choice, then privacy rights are consonant with
it.110 But on a different view, class structure is part of this economy. Who
occupies what role is, of course, decided by the interplay of personal choice
and social structure.111 But that there will be employers and employees,
investors, and day laborers, is—for now—fate.112

108. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2463 (“The right to eschew association for expressive
purposes is likewise protected.”).
109. Cf. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 277–78 (1990) (describing
the common law protection against unwanted contact as a basis for a right to refuse
unwanted medical care and locating that same right in the privacy interest protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment).
110. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593, 2598–99 (2015) (holding
that the right to marry whom you choose is an essential element of the constitutional privacy interest in self-deﬁnition and self-expression); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562,
567 (2003) (holding that the same constitutional privacy interests protect the free choice
of sexual partners).
111. See generally Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the
Theory of Structuration 1–40 (1984) (outlining a social theory attentive to both structure
and the ways these structures are continually recreated by agents).
112. See, e.g., G.A. Cohen, The Structure of Proletarian Unfreedom, 12 Phil. & Pub.
Aff. 3, 11–12 (1983) (arguing that individual mobility does not alter the “collective unfreedom”
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It is because of shared fate that processes of collective will formation
become essential. To begin with an analogy to the workplace, politics is
not an optional undertaking. It is a response to the fact that for certain
purposes people are trapped together—in shared economic regimes,
shared regimes of legitimate violence113—and there must be some process for determining the rules of those regimes. Democracy is, of course,
optional, at both the individual and the systemic levels. But its efforts at
collective will formation are an alternative not to the absence of politics
but to a different political dispensation. The right way to see unions, on
this view, is as akin to political subcommunities. A vote on unionization is
more like a constitutional referendum than it is like the election of representatives, and once a union exists it is a forum of collective will formation within its workplace, appropriately binding on all who are, so to
speak, within that jurisdiction.114 Organized labor presents a political-economic counterweight to wealth, an essential institution of rough civic
equality.115 Absent clear suppression of a core interest in political speech,
the First Amendment should not be interpreted as protecting personal
rights that undercut this democratic institution.
B.

Two Ways of Seeing the Inseparability of Politics and Economics

It is ironic that toward the end of his career in 1961, Justice
Frankfurter took the same conceptual view of union activity that Justice
Alito does today—that it is impossible to separate bread-and-butter economic representation from political advocacy—while drawing the opposite conclusion from that insight. For Alito, the inseparability of union
representation from political advocacy means that even mandatory
funding of representation is problematic under the First Amendment,
because there is no getting politics out of it.116 Frankfurter’s course of
reasoning was the opposite. While Alito proceeds nominally from a conception of what is political speech (and so the concern of the First
Amendment) and ﬁnds that it sweeps in all union advocacy, Frankfurter
of class society, which guarantees that a substantial share of people will always occupy a
subordinate class position).
113. See, e.g., Jonah Birch, Ending Their Wars, Jacobin (May 28, 2018), https://
www.jacobinmag.com/2018/05/war-socialists-debs-vietnam-internationalism [https://perma.
cc/Z3M8-D35F] (“In the organization of state violence on an unprecedented scale, we see
capitalism’s tendency to subordinate human need to the logic of proﬁt and power.”).
114. See Gabriel Winant, Where Did It All Go Wrong?, Nation (Feb. 7, 2018),
https://www.thenation.com/article/organized-labors-lost-generations [https://perma.cc/
WTW2-JCNF] (giving this characterization of union elections).
115. See, e.g., James Feigenbaum et al., Opinion, Right-to-Work Laws Have Devastated
Unions—and Democrats, N.Y. Times (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/
08/opinion/conor-lamb-unions-pennsylvania.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review)
(summarizing research showing a sharp drop in electoral support for Democrats where
state laws weaken the labor movement).
116. See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448,
2480–81 (2018).
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proceeded from the assumption that unions played a legitimate and
important role in American self-rule and reasoned that the activity in
which they have historically engaged should enjoy a presumption of constitutionality.117 For Frankfurter, casting constitutional doubt on the
standard legislative mechanisms for funding union advocacy “would be
completely to ignore the long history of union conduct and its pervasive
acceptance in our political life.”118 Frankfurter took for granted the
fundamentally collective character of unions, with its consequence that
they cannot do their work if they are unable to generate mandatory
forms of collective action. He analogized the speech situation of the
union dues payer to that of the federal taxpayer and offered as a premise
that a union could not be said to violate its members’ speech interests
when it called a strike.119 What, after all, would a union be if it were not a
locus of collective action? It would be like a state that could not make
law.120
Frankfurter’s view serves as a coda to this discussion, and also a bridge
to an alternative, democratic political economy in First Amendment
doctrine. In this view, a democratic polity has an interest in structuring
economic power and its translation into political power in ways that
counteract the structural advantages of wealth and coordination that
otherwise strengthen owners and employers. Institutions that balance the
power of wealth by enabling working people to combine for effective
advocacy—in collective bargaining and in the broader contests of
politics—should be assumed to be compatible with First Amendment
interests unless there is a very strong showing to the contrary. But such a
showing must not rest on ﬁndings that a union imposes unity on the
voices of its members, once the union has been authorized to represent
them, nor on the worry that unions might make distributional demands
on the state. That would be condemning them for doing their job in the
constitutional order.

117. See Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 812–13 (1961) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting) (describing historically the accepted role of unions in pursuing workplace
goals through political activity).
118. Id. at 812.
119. See id. at 806, 810.
120. Here and in this Essay’s framing, there is a certain elision of the distinction
between public-sector and private-sector unions, although that distinction is essential to
the technical premise of Janus. My reasons are that (1) from the standpoint I am advocating, the two domains have essential commonalities because both are areas of workers’
collective power, and the rationale that Justice Frankfurter applied to private-sector unions
also applies to public-sector ones; and (2) in the Janus oral argument, Justices Ginsburg
and Breyer both speculated that a ruling against the union might also tend to undermine
private-sector unions, with Justice Ginsburg even suggesting that Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1 (1948), might prohibit judicial enforcement of union agreements. See Transcript of
Oral Argument, supra note 105, at 28–29.
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CONCLUSION
Progressive engagement with First Amendment doctrine should start
by recognizing that any plausible version of civic equality and self-rule
requires political engagement with the terms of self-rule. If appropriately
constituted majorities cannot decide how majorities shall rule, then
other forces will. This point has particular bite in a regime of capitalist
democracy, in which historical and contemporary empirics strongly suggest that unequal economic power tends to grow over time and to embed
itself in political power. Some legally ordered relationship between
political power and economic power is not just inevitable; its substance is
of the ﬁrst importance, because only it can sustain countervailing principles of equal citizenship, common good, and self-rule. In the face of a
candidly neoliberal jurisprudence that advances the political domination
of the wealthy, it is all the more important to recover and develop a constitutionalism of social democracy.

